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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

PROCEDURE IN ECLIPSE:
GROUP-BASED ADJUDICATION IN A POST-CONCEPCION ERA

MYRIAM GILLES*
“[L]et me be clear that while I believe Due Process Procedure to be in
eclipse, it is surely not dead.”1
INTRODUCTION
Running through Professor Judith Resnik’s body of work is a deep and
abiding interest in and exploration of the significance of real-life lawyers and
judges in the civil justice system—their shared responsibility to discover,
conceptualize, evaluate, frame, consolidate, monitor, negotiate, adjudicate, and
decide complex cases. This theme is a constant in her recent book,
Representing Justice, co-written with Dennis Curtis,2 which brings together
many strands of Professor Resnik’s long and illustrious academic and legal
career.
Representing Justice chronicles the changing nature of adjudication in the
twentieth century. In classic Resnikian terms, our uniquely American form of
adjudication envisions courts “in conversation . . . with the citizenry about the
normative” content of law.3 In this vision, open adjudicatory processes are
themselves a foundation of democracy—legitimating government power and
allowing the public a lens into the way law functions.4 Mapping the rise and

* Professor of Law, Cardozo Law School. I would like to thank Judith Resnik, Dennis Curtis, the
organizers of the 2011 Richard J. Childress Memorial Lecture at Saint Louis University School of
Law, and my co-presenters and panelists. This Article draws significantly from a recent paper I
co-wrote with Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility
v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623 (2012).
1. Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 624 (2005)
[hereinafter Resnik, Procedure].
2. JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION,
CONTROVERSY, AND RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS (2011).
3. Judith Resnik, Dennis E. Curtis & Deborah R. Hensler, Individuals Within the
Aggregate: Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296, 306 (1996)
[hereinafter Resnik, Curtis & Hensler, Individuals].
4. Id. at 382 (“What courts offer . . . are opportunities for public participation, for
transformative exchanges about, as well as reaffirmation of, social and moral values.”); id. at 306
(we “aspire[] to a court system in conversation with litigants and with the citizenry about the
normative context in which we live and its practical import. Courts are celebrated because their
1203
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fall of this adjudicatory model against a background evolution in architecture
and visual representations of law and justice, Professors Resnik and Curtis
teach us that, as the law granted more individuals legal personhood and the
concomitant ability to have their grievances aired in open court through
transparent and fair procedural rules, a strain was put on judges, on procedure,
on the provision of justice itself.5 And this strain led judges and policymakers
to embrace dilutive and destructive versions of the original conception of open
adjudication.6
Professor Resnik’s managerial judge therefore portrays a willingness to
prioritize settlement over hearing both sides;7 on managing the process rather
than providing due process;8 on promoting and legitimating “alternatives” to
open adjudication—alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”), mediation, private
arbitration.9
So by the close of the twentieth century, Professors Resnik and Curtis
chronicle, the celebrated and uniquely American model of providing publiclysubsidized, broadly-available means of adjudicating disputes was in sharp
decline, along with other public institutions once regarded as vital to
disseminating knowledge about the government—such as the press and post
office.10

processes have the capacity to dignify and respect individuals’ entitlements to voice and
efficacy.”); see also Courtroom Use: Access to Justice, Effective Judicial Administration, and
Courtroom Security: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts & Competition Policy of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 84 (2010) (statement of Judith Resnik) (“[P]ublic
adjudicatory procedures make important contributions to functioning democracies.”); Judith
Resnik, Due Process: A Public Dimension, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 405, 419–20 (1987) [hereinafter
Resnik, A Public Dimension]; Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v.
Concepcion, Wal-mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 82–83 (2011)
[hereinafter Resnik, Fairness in Numbers] (asserting that “public processes” are an important
facet of “due process norms—the obligation to open adjudicatory processes to third parties, so as
to illuminate and monitor the other facets of the process ‘due’ and, in democratic orders, to
legitimate the binding power of the judgments made”).
5. See RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 2, at 306–10.
6. See Judith Resnik, For Owen M. Fiss: Some Reflections on the Triumph and the Death of
Adjudication, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 173, 199–200 (2003) [hereinafter Resnik, For Owen M. Fiss]
(arguing that the last century has seen the triumph of adjudication but also its demise, through
growth of alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) and administrative process, and that
“[a]djudication’s supporters need to return to their claims for adjudication and ask how
adjudication can be refashioned to deliver its promises more broadly”).
7. Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376–77 (1982).
8. Id. at 425–26, 430.
9. See Resnik, For Owen M. Fiss, supra note 6, at 188 (explaining that by the end of the
twentieth century, federal judges had embraced alternatives to adjudication, such as arbitration, to
allow the parties to resolve their disputes at a lower cost).
10. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 2, at 304–07.
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Nowhere has this strain on, and resultant abandonment of, the adjudicatory
ideal been more acutely felt than in the world of class actions. In many ways,
class actions and aggregate litigation represent the law’s best-effort at
procedural democracy, at providing access to courts for groups—consumers,
employees, small business owners—that would otherwise be unable to have
their claims openly adjudicated.11 But the story of class actions mirrors in
many ways the narrative of adjudication that Professors Resnik and Curtis
trace more generally: from the adoption of the 1966 class action rule12 forward,
as more class actions were certified,13 more strain was put on judges to manage
quite ungainly processes. Critiques of the class action became increasingly
sharp. Foremost was the assertion that the agency costs inherent in
representative litigation were too high, giving class action lawyers tremendous
and nearly unfettered power to extract massive settlements from risk-averse
corporations.14 Other accounts stressed the due process and autonomy-based
concerns of voice, exit, and opportunity of class members to actively engage in
group-based adjudication.15
Taken together, these critiques severely
challenged courts in ways that parallel the Resnik and Curtis account of
adjudication more broadly.

11. Resnik, Curtis & Hensler, Individuals, supra note 3, at 299 (“[O]ne of the primary
purposes of class actions is to enable groups otherwise without legal representation to obtain
access to courts; the group creates sufficiently large economic or social interests to attract
attorney attention and entrepreneurial risk-taking.”); see also Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra
note 4, at 84 (describing the class action rule as providing “consumers claiming statutory rights
the capacity to attract lawyers through the potential for large monetary recoveries”).
12. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (amended 1966).
13. John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1344–45 (1995) (explaining that by the end of the 1980s, class actions
were increasingly certified).
14. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs
Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 103, 156 n.199
(2006) (citing John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing
Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 882–83 (1987); Bruce
Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions: Reality
and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1402 (2000) (“Risk averse parties will pay a
premium to avoid taking a gamble.”); Note, Risk-Preference Asymmetries in Class Action
Litigation, 119 HARV. L. REV. 587, 600 (2005) (noting that in a “low-merit suit” the defendant’s
risk aversion will be heightened, and a “risk-averse defendant would likely pay a high premium to
avoid the variance of a class action trial.”)).
15. Resnik, Curtis & Hensler, Individuals, supra note 3, at 318 n.63, 320, 391–95; see also
id. at 389–90 (“[I]n some class actions, class representatives [should] have to fashion means to
ensure the delivery of legal services and procedural opportunities for individual clients. . . .
[S]tatutes or other rules that create provisions for aggregation should acknowledge the existence
of variation among claimants within an aggregate. . . . [J]udges [should] police those procedures
by warning lawyers that failure to meet these obligations could be grounds for disaggregation and
could be relevant to the payment of both costs and fees.”).
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In general and over time, judges and legislators became increasingly
suspicious of class actions, and sought ways to curtail access to group
adjudication. Courts ramped up the standards governing the certification of
damages16 and injunctive classes,17 and created new standing requirements for
consumer class actions.18 Congress enacted legislative reforms, such as the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act19 and the Class Action Fairness Act.20

16. See, e.g., In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 316, 320 (3d Cir.
2008) (“An overlap between a class certification requirement and the merits of a claim is no
reason to decline to resolve relevant disputes when necessary to determine whether a class
certification requirement is met. . . . Factual determinations necessary to make Rule 23 findings
must be made by a preponderance of the evidence.”); In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471
F.3d 24, 41–42 (2d Cir. 2006) (rejecting the “some showing” standard and adopting a
requirement that plaintiffs provide definitive proof, through “affidavits, documents, or testimony,
to . . . [establish] that each Rule 23 requirement has been met”); see also J. Douglas Richards &
Benjamin D. Brown, Predominance of Common Questions—Common Mistakes in Applying the
Class Action Standard, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 163, 168–69 (2009).
17. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2556–57 (2011). By redefining the
hitherto easy-to-satisfy commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2), the Supreme Court in WalMart made injunctive cases nearly as difficult to certify as damages cases under the
IPO/Hydrogen Peroxide line of cases. See id.; supra note 16.
18. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Class Dismissed: Contemporary Judicial Hostility to SmallClaims Consumer Class Actions, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 305, 310, 316 (2010) (describing the
development of an “implicit requirement” of ascertainability, under which courts in consumer
cases have refused to certify classes in the absence of “reliable proof of purchase or a knowable
list of injured plaintiffs” and asserting that this new standing requirement dooms many consumer
class actions arising from small retail purchases because consumers are unlikely to retain the
proof of purchase necessary to satisfy ascertainability); see also In re Teflon Prods. Liab. Litig.,
254 F.R.D. 354, 357, 365, 371 (S.D. Iowa 2008) (denying certification and asserting that “where
claims turn on individual facts . . . the typicality requirement cannot be met” in a products
liability suit where plaintiffs had purchased cookware coated with Teflon); In re Conagra Peanut
Butter Prods. Liab. Litig., 251 F.R.D. 689, 691, 699 (N.D. Ga. 2008) (denying class certification
to a group of plaintiffs who purchased contaminated peanut butter, and asserting that “the
governing law requires individual proof of damages”); In re Fresh Del Monte Pineapples
Antitrust Litig., No. 1:04-md-1628 (RMB), 2008 WL 5661873, at *3, *5, *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20,
2008) (denying certification to the “Indirect Purchaser Class” of pineapples in part due to these
plaintiffs’ failure to retain and present “proof of purchases made during the Class period”); In re
Phenylpropanolamine Prods. Liab. Litig., 214 F.R.D. 614, 617–18 (W.D. Wash. 2003) (“Here,
individuals would be required to show some proof of injury—in this case purchase and
possession of a non-expired PPA-containing product . . . . The court doubts that many individuals
will still have records of minor purchases such as these products dating back to the fall of
2000.”).
19. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.). This Act provides that the lead
plaintiff—the class member with the largest claimed loss who seeks the position, 15 U.S.C. §
77z-1 (a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb) (2006)—shall “select and retain counsel to represent the class.” 15
U.S.C. § 77z (a)(3)(B)(v). The PSLRA “transformed the lead plaintiff process from a ‘race to the
courthouse’ to an orderly procedure.” David H. Webber, Is “Pay-to-Play” Driving Public
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Taken together, these “reforms” have had the overall and generally intended
effect of pushing litigants towards non-collective, non-adjudicatory remedies.21
Yet, throughout these decades of arguing about and seeking means to
reform class actions and aggregate litigation, Rule 23’s procedures22 remained
viable and accessible, representing both the great promise and the significant
problems of the Resnikian adjudicatory model.23 At the very least, these
procedural devices remained generally viable until the Supreme Court’s April
2011 decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, finding state-law rules
invalidating class action waivers on unconscionability grounds preempted by
the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).24
So while Professor Resnik wrote the epigraph cited above just seven years
ago—expressing her belief that procedural due process was not dead, but
merely “in eclipse”25—the decision in Concepcion challenges this view with
regard to aggregate litigation. The decision to uphold class waivers and
disallow the aggregation of legal claims is a direct rejection of the Resnikian
adjudicatory model that seeks to provide “opportunities for public

Pension Fund Activism In Securities Class Actions? An Empirical Study, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2031,
2038 (2010).
20. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.). CAFA expands federal diversity jurisdiction over class actions to include
any case with more than 100 plaintiffs and $5 million in controversy. Class Action Fairness Act
of 2005 § 4 (codified as amended in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2)(A), 1332(d)(5)(B)); see also EMERY
G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE IMPACT OF THE CLASS ACTION
FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 ON THE FEDERAL COURTS: FOURTH INTERIM REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 2 (2008), available at http://www.us
courts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Fourth%20Interim%20Report%20Class%20Ac
tion.pdf (reporting an increase in number of removals to federal court immediately after CAFA
was enacted, followed by a flattening to pre-CAFA levels).
21. There are some indications that net class action filings have remained consistent over the
past three years. See, e.g., FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI L.L.P., 7TH ANNUAL LITIGATION TRENDS
SURVEY FINDINGS 19 (2010), available at http://www.fulbright.com/litigationtrends. Given the
increased evidentiary and burden-of-proof standards that plaintiffs must satisfy, a significant
number of these classes are not certified. See Joel S. Feldman, Simone Cruickshank & Gary
McGinnis, Evidentiary and Burden of Proof Standards for Class Certification Rulings, 11 CLASS
ACTION LITIG. REP. (BNA), June 11, 2010, at 536, 536, 539. Securities fraud class actions
appear to be the exception. See, e.g., JORDAN MILEV, ROBERT PATTON & SVETLANA STARYKH,
NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCS., RECENT TRENDS IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS: 2011 MIDYEAR REVIEW 1 (2011) (reporting that securities class action filings remained steady in the first
half of 2011 and suggesting that “a wave of new cases alleging breach of fiduciary duty in
connection with mergers and acquisitions” is the cause).
22. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
23. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (describing the Resnikian adjudicatory model).
24. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).
25. Resnik, Procedure, supra note 1, at 624.
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participation.”26 Rather, on this new vision of non-adjudication, the legal
claims of consumers, employees and others (to the extent they can be brought
at all) occur in private one-on-one arbitration rather than the public,
participatory forum of a courtroom.27 In this brave new world, judges are
disabled from adjudicating claims involving broadly inflicted harms, and
private lawyers are no longer incentivized to ferret out mass wrongs and to
litigate small claims. So irrespective of whether one buys into the Posnerian
critiques about the over-empowerment of class action plaintiffs,28 or the
Resnikian concern with “[g]roup litigation [as] basically belong[ing] to judges,
special masters, and lawyers—talking only with each other and making
decisions about categories of claims”29 the debate is now moot. Suddenly,
defendants hold the power to avoid aggregate dispute resolution through the
simple expedient of including boilerplate waivers in their standard form
contracts.30
This is the world in which we find ourselves in the aftermath of
Concepcion. Newly validated by Justice Scalia’s majority opinion, class
action waivers will soon seep into every contract31—whether signed, clicked,
mass-emailed, posted on a website, or otherwise “consented to”—until
aggregate litigation itself becomes a procedural relic examined only briefly in
courses on the legal history of the twentieth century, that long-ago era where
legal claims were actually adjudicated in public courts of law.32 If this is an
eclipse, it is difficult to see what will make the sun come out again.

26. See Resnik, Curtis & Hensler, Individuals, supra note 3, at 382; see also supra note 3
and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra note 4, at 87 (“Indeed, it is the
performance of fairness before the public that legitimates adjudication.”).
28. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1294, 1297–98 (7th Cir. 1995)
(describing “the sheer magnitude of the risk to which the class action, in contrast to . . . individual
actions . . . exposes” defendants and worrying that such massive liability exposure will create
“intense pressure to settle”).
29. Resnik, Curtis & Hensler, Individuals, supra note 3, at 399.
30. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753, 1755 (2011)
(invalidating California’s Discover Bank rule, which found class-action waivers in arbitration
agreements contained in certain consumer contracts of adhesion unconscionable).
31. See id. at 1743, 1753.
32. Indeed, a major theme of REPRESENTING JUSTICE is the changing nature of adjudication
in the twenty-first century. See RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 2, at 306–10. As Professor Resnik
asserts, even as Americans built grander and grander courthouses during that century—“glorious
new edifices to adjudication”—these houses of justice became available to fewer and fewer
litigants—mainly wealthy, corporate, repeat players using courts as one of multiple means
towards their desired ends. Judith Resnik, Whither and Whether Adjudication?, 86 B.U. L. REV.
1101, 1154 (2006) [hereinafter Resnik, Whither Adjudication?] (“[T]he large and distinguished
new buildings of courthouses may well capture the practices of contemporary adjudication—that
it is a luxury good, available for only a few, inhabiting sparsely populated and gracious
buildings.”).
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As with so many legal developments, Professor Resnik foresaw this
general retreat from adjudication long ago and early on sounded the warning
that broad acceptance of arbitration had given rise to a troubling body of
contract procedure that forced most civil litigation out of open-forum courts.33
She, who famously reproduced her actual cell phone agreement (with its
typical class action waiver) in a 2006 article on the demise of the adjudicatory
model, also anticipated the rise of class action waivers.34 But few could have
predicted the breathtakingly broad decision in Concepcion, nor the shallow
opportunities for class action litigation that remain in its wake.35
This Article, inspired by and written in honor of Professor Resnik, seeks to
examine the gloomy post-Concepcion landscape and to ponder the possibility
of reshaping aggregate litigation through the offices of the states’ attorneys
general, bringing claims on behalf of injured citizens pursuant to their parens
patriae authority. For Resnik, a principal value of open adjudication is the
public’s participatory presence, which enables the electorate to “form
independent judgments about the quality of government actions,” forcing
information into the public realm that “becomes part of iterative exchanges
with other branches of government” and “help[ing] to generate a new set of
democratic norms.”36 But if courts are no longer willing and able to engage in
this “ambitious project that put[s] government processes before the public eye
and offer[s] access to all,”37 then we must consider whether other institutions
of government are available to meet these needs.
My argument, which draws heavily from other recent work,38 is that “the
‘private attorney general’ role assumed by class action lawyers over the past

33. Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
494, 539–41 (1986) [hereinafter Resnik, Failing Faith] (examining emerging hostility toward
adjudication).
34. Resnik, Whither Adjudication?, supra note 32, at 1134–36 (“[B]y unwrapping the phone
and activating the new service, I waived my rights to go to court and became obligated to
‘arbitrate disputes arising out of or related to’ this or ‘prior agreements.’ Further, both the
provider and I agreed to waive our rights to pursue any ‘class action or class arbitration.’”); see
also RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 2, at 319, fig.201 (reproducing Professor Resnik’s cell phone
contract).
35. Though writing back in 2006, Professor Resnik was quite pessimistic, warning that the
“continued diminution of adjudicatory possibilities comes from the current composition of both
the Congress and the federal judiciary, as well as the concerted campaigns to curb the use of
courts (replete with anti-trial lawyer advertisements) by private sector actors.” Resnik, Whither
Adjudication?, supra note 32, at 1150.
36. Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra note 4, at 91–92, 168.
37. Id. at 168.
38. See generally Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the
Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623 (2012) [hereinafter Gilles &
Friedman, After Class] (arguing that state attorneys general “have the ability to fill the void
created by class actions . . . through expanded use of the parens patriae authority”).
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several decades [could] give way to a world in which state attorneys general
make broad use of their parens patriae authority . . . to represent the interests
of their citizens” in the types of class actions that are now blocked by the
waivers.39 This Article situates the state AGs as a second-best solution, and
parens patriae litigation as a viable alternative to the open adjudication of
claims. My assertion is not that reliance on state AGs is ideal, but only that in
the aftermath of Concepcion and the growing hostility towards broad rightsbased litigation, it may be the only viable option for group-based
adjudication.40
Part I sketches the legal topography of the pre- and post-Concepcion
landscape, charting the rise of class action waivers up to the April 2011
Supreme Court ruling, and suggesting a handful of legal challenges and
legislative responses to waivers that remain viable today. Part II asks whether
viable alternatives to class actions exist in the wake of Concepcion—
specifically, whether we might look to regulatory agencies to bring claims or
seek changes to broad-scale injurious practices, or whether individual
arbitration of claims could realistically replace class or aggregate litigation.
Finding these alternatives sorely lacking, Part III presents the state AGs as a
possible savior of the wounded class action mechanism. This final part is
merely an outline—more muscular analysis awaits—but the general idea of
state AGs using their parens patriae authority to bring claims on behalf of
injured citizens seeks to leverage many of the benefits of a public adjudicatory
system that Professors Resnik and Curtis extol: responsible public officials in
dialogue with their community on shared issues of significance, seeking
efficient and just means of resolving disputes and communicating normative
aspects of law and democracy.41 In this final Part, I endeavor to gauge the
state AG model against Resnikian standards; her views and her writings
provide an intricate atlas that may help map our progress from this point to the
next, post-eclipse stage of aggregate litigation.

39. See id. at 630.
40. See, e.g., RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 2, at 315 (describing the devolution of judicial
authority to agencies as “a second-best response, a necessary adaptation in the face of [increasing]
demand”).
41. See Resnik, Curtis & Hensler, Individuals, supra note 3, at 306.
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I. AT&T MOBILITY LLC V. CONCEPCION:
THE ASCENDANCE OF CLASS ACTION WAIVERS
The vast majority of class actions are based on some sort of contractual
relationship, often in the form of a standard-form contract.42 This is true of
nearly all consumer, employment, and antitrust class actions, as well as “class
actions relating to insurance benefits, ERISA plans, mutual funds, franchise
agreements, and an endless variety of other matters.”43 Beginning as early as
the 1940s, companies began to insert in their contracts arbitration provisions
requiring disputes to be arbitrated before the American Arbitration Association
or the National Arbitration Forum, rather than litigated in courts.44 At first,
courts were “reluctant to enforce contracts to arbitrate”: “[p]rotective of their
special mandate, judges frowned on [these] agreements.”45 But by the 1980s,
the Supreme Court had “reread federal statutes to permit—rather than to
prohibit—enforcement of arbitration contracts” pursuant to the FAA.46 In the
late 1980s and into the 1990s, the Court further “moved from accepting
arbitration clauses to a posture of slavish deference” in a set of rulings finding
that the FAA applies in state as well as federal court proceedings and preempts
state legislation affecting arbitration.47 By the dawn of the twenty-first
century, it was clear that the Supreme Court “insisted on the validity of
contracts that put dispute resolution outside of courthouses and away from
open and public hearings.”48
42. Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the
Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 375 (2005) [hereinafter Gilles, Opting Out].
43. Id.
44. See id. at 396–97; see also Resnik, Curtis & Hensler, Individuals, supra note 3, at 327,
331 (“The orientation has shifted from a focus on regulatory rights-pronouncement and individual
litigants to an emphasis on dispute resolution, which has been facilitated by court adoption of
settlement conferences, court-annexed arbitration, and other modes of encouraging consensual
dispositions.”).
45. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 2, at 319; see also Resnik, Procedure, supra note 1, at
619–20 (“[T]he law [has] been ambivalent about enforcing obligations to participate in private
dispute resolution at the expense of access to public processes. Judges guarded their own
monopoly power and regularly refused to enforce arbitration contracts.”).
46. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 2, at 320; see also Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am.
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 478–79, 483, 486 (1989) (finding that claims under the Securities
Act of 1933 were arbitrable); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 641 (1985) (announcing a “federal policy favoring arbitration”); Moses H. Cone Mem’l
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (“[Q]uestions of arbitrability must be
addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration.”); Judith Resnik,
Procedure’s Projects, 23 CIV. JUST. Q. 273, 289 (2004) (“Over the course of the twentieth
century, the attitudes of legislators and court-based adjudicators [towards arbitration] changed.”).
47. Gilles, Opting Out, supra note 42, at 393–94 n.108; see also Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v.
Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996) (finding that the FAA preempted a state-law requirement
that a contract containing an arbitration clause include notification on the first page of the
contract); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995) (rejecting arguments
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Buoyed by this extraordinary judicial deference, some companies went a
step further, inserting class action waivers in contractual arbitration provisions.
Class action waivers work “to ensure that any claim against the corporate
defendant may be asserted only in a one-on-one, non-aggregated arbitral
proceeding. More virulent strains of the clause force the would-be plaintiff to
waive even her right to be represented as a passive, or absent, class member”
or to finance or aid in the commencement of a class proceeding by another
injured party.49 In short, class action waivers doom any aggregate or group
litigation, so it isn’t at all surprising that corporate defendants with a keen
interest in avoiding class action liability have aggressively adopted and
defended the validity of these contractual devices.50
The movement to insert class action waivers in consumer contracts51
accelerated in 1999, when the National Arbitration Forum, “a for-profit arbitral
body designated in the arbitration provisions of many large companies,
disseminated marketing materials cautioning corporate attorneys that the only

by twenty state attorneys general in finding that the FAA applies in state as well as federal court);
Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 484, 491 (1987) (holding the FAA preempted the California
Labor Code, which authorized an action for the collection of wages “without regard to the
existence of any private agreement to arbitrate”); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10, 15–
16 (1984) (holding that the FAA applies in state courts and preempting state legislation
interpreted to protect franchisees from unfair arbitration agreements); David S. Schwartz,
Correcting Federalism Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court and the Federal
Arbitration Act, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004, at 5, 5 (“Despite its constant,
talismanic repetition, the ‘national policy favoring arbitration’ is illusory and is highly dubious
federalism.”). Professor Resnik has compared the Class Action Fairness Act to the Supreme
Court’s arbitration-preemption jurisprudence, writing both are “part of a cohort of enactments and
doctrinal developments of this era that preempt state decision making and push litigants toward
noncollective and nonadjudicative remedies such as privately sponsored arbitration programs.”
Judith Resnik, Lessons in Federalism from the 1960s Class Action Rule and the 2005 Class
Action Fairness Act: “The Political Safeguards” of Aggregate Translocal Actions, 156 U. PA. L.
REV. 1929, 1930 (2008).
48. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 2, at 320.
49. Gilles, Opting Out, supra note 42, at 375–76.
50. See, e.g., Skirchak v. Dynamics Research Corp., 508 F.3d 49, 51, 58 n.4 (1st Cir. 2007)
(appealing from the district court’s order striking the class waiver and arguing for its validity
based on “the company’s assumption of the costs of mediation and arbitration, reimbursement of
legal costs up to $2,500 to each employee who wishes to arbitrate, the mutuality of the obligation
to arbitrate, and the ease and speed of arbitration”); Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance of Ga.,
LLC, 400 F.3d 868, 882–83 (11th Cir. 2005) (appealing and obtaining a reversal of the district
court’s finding that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and unenforceable); Tillman v.
Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 655 S.E.2d 362, 373 (N.C. 2008) (“Defendants argue that finding
this [arbitration] clause to be unconscionable would be ‘hostile to arbitration.’”).
51. See Judith Resnik, Courts: In and Out of Sight, Site, and Cite, 53 VILL. L. REV. 771, 796
(2008) (“[The] worldwide movement toward ADR is propelled by political and social forces
trumpeting deregulation and privatization and is staffed by lawyers and other professionals
seeking and shaping new markets.”).
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way to insulate their clients from class action liability . . . was to implement
arbitration provisions containing [class action waivers].”52 Companies were
responsive: American Express sent notices to roughly 1.5 million smallmerchant accounts providing that agreements would be deemed to include
arbitration provisions containing express class waivers;53 cell phone and
internet companies informed customers in monthly bill-stuffers that continued
usage of their phones or data service plans constituted agreement to class
action waivers;54 and waivers quickly began popping up in standard-form
contracts with shippers,55 health clubs,56 and other ordinary goods and services
providers.57
A.

Unconscionability Challenges circa 1999-2011

Inevitably, some of the companies that implemented class action waivers
found themselves as defendants in putative class actions.58 As those
defendants asserted the waivers as a defense, plaintiffs’ lawyers looked for
ways to challenge their enforceability. The common law contract doctrine of
unconscionability appeared promising:59 under the FAA, a party may oppose

52. Gilles, Opting Out, supra note 42, at 397.
53. In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., No. 03 CV 9592(GBD), 2006 WL 662341, at *2, *9
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2006).
54. See, e.g., Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05CV1167 DMS (AJB), 2008 WL 5216255,
at *2 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008), aff’d, Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir.
2009), rev’d, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). Note that under the
FAA, arbitration clauses need not be signed to be enforceable. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
55. See Answer and Jury Demand of Defendant Fed. Express Corp. at 21, Moody v. Fed.
Express Corp., No. 02 L 601 (Ill. Cir. Feb. 6, 2003) (asserting that each putative class member, all
customers of FedEx, “agreed in their contracts with FedEx that each ‘will not sue [FedEx] as a
class’”).
56. See Benjamin Sachs-Michaels, The Demise of Class Actions Will Not Be Televised, 12
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 665, 667 (2011).
57. See, e.g., Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1217, 1218 (11th Cir. 2007) (involving
a contract with a cable TV provider containing a class action waiver); Shroyer v. New Cingular
Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 978, 980, 984 (9th Cir. 2007) (involving a contract for cell
phone service containing a class action waiver); Fluke v. CashCall, Inc., No. 08-05776, 2009 WL
1437593, at *1, *2 (E.D. Pa. May 21, 2009) (involving a contract with a payday lender containing
a class action waiver); Brazil v. Dell Inc., No. C-07-01700 RMW, 2007 WL 2255296, at *1, *2
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2007) (involving an agreement for a computer purchase containing a class
action waiver).
58. See supra note 57.
59. Basic contract law directs that a contractual provision be deemed unenforceable if it is
both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.
Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011). Procedural unconscionability focuses on “oppression” or “surprise” due
to unequal bargaining power, while substantive unconscionability focuses on “overly harsh” or
“one-sided” results. Id.; see also 6A ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1376,
at 21 (1962) (stating that standardized contracts offered to individuals on an “‘accept this or get
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arbitration on such “grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract,”60 and seventeen years ago, the Supreme Court held that
unconscionability provides one such ground.61
At first, courts were skeptical of these unconscionability challenges leveled
at the class action waivers, and the vast majority of early decisions upheld the
waivers against this challenge.62 The tide turned in 2005, when the California
Supreme Court decided in Discover Bank v. Superior Court that “at least some
class action waivers in consumer contracts are unconscionable under California
law.”63 Specifically, where class action waivers “operate effectively as
exculpatory contract clauses that are contrary to public policy,” the court held
them invalid.64 Other state courts soon followed the Discover Bank ruling, and
by 2011, fourteen state supreme courts had invalidated class action waivers on
unconscionability grounds.65 By the time of the Concepcion decision in April
2011, “the trend was unmistakable: class action waivers were being defeated in
courts around the country.”66
B.

The Concepcion Decision

In April 2011, a closely divided Supreme Court decided AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion, rejecting the unconscionability challenge to waivers that
had gained significant traction in the state courts over the past decade.67 The
Concepcion case arises from facts that are fairly typical of everyday consumer
transactions: Vincent and Liza Concepcion signed up for a two-year service
agreement with AT&T Mobility in order to receive a “free” cell phone, but
then learned that they had to pay $30.22 in sales tax for the putatively free

nothing’ basis” are subject to vigilant judicial scrutiny to avoid enforcement of unconscionable
provisions).
60. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
61. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (“[G]enerally applicable
contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate
arbitration agreements without contravening §2 [of the FAA].”).
62. See, e.g., Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance, 400 F.3d 868, 882–83 (11th Cir. 2005);
Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 176 (5th Cir. 2004);
Livingston v. Assocs. Fin., Inc., 339 F.3d 553, 558 (7th Cir. 2003); Snowden v. CheckPoint
Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 631, 638–39 (4th Cir. 2002).
63. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1108 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
64. Id. at 1105–06, 1108, 1110 (explaining that the public policy concern was founded on
the “important role of class action remedies in California law” as “the only effective way to halt
and redress [consumer] exploitation”).
65. See Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 38, at 633.
66. Id.
67. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746–48, 1753 (2011).
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device.68 The Concepcions filed a class action lawsuit alleging consumer
fraud, and AT&T moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration
clause in its standard service agreement, which contained a class action
waiver.69 In ruling on AT&T’s motion to compel arbitration, a reluctant
district court felt itself duty-bound by Discover Bank to invalidate the class
action waiver.70 The Ninth Circuit affirmed.71
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to “consider whether the FAA
prohibits States from conditioning the enforceability of certain arbitration
agreements on the availability of classwide arbitration procedures.”72 In
arguing against preemption, the plaintiffs focused on the FAA’s saving clause,
and asserted that the Discover Bank rule holding class action waivers
unconscionable applies with equal force to contracts mandating arbitration or
those banning class actions in court.73
But a slim majority of the Supreme Court disagreed, finding California’s
Discover Bank rule too broad to be covered by the FAA’s saving clause.74 As
Justice Scalia wrote, “[a]lthough § 2’s saving clause preserves generally
applicable contract defenses, nothing in it suggests an intent to preserve statelaw rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s
objectives.”75 The majority found the categorical nature the Discover Bank
rule posed just such an obstacle, as it essentially allows any consumer to
demand classwide arbitration.76 As such, the Court found the state law
unconscionability approach of California and fourteen other states preempted
by the FAA.77

68. Id. at 1744; Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 852 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d,
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
69. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744–45.
70. Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05CV1167 DMS (AJB), 2008 WL 5216255, at *14
(S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008), aff’d, Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009),
rev’d, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
71. Laster, 584 F.3d at 857, 859 (asserting that the Discover Bank ruling was a “refinement
of the unconscionability analysis applicable to contracts generally in California” and therefore did
not discriminate against arbitration).
72. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744.
73. Id. at 1746.
74. Id. at 1747–48, 1753.
75. Id. at 1748.
76. Id. at 1750 (“California’s Discover Bank rule . . . interferes with arbitration. Although
the rule does not require classwide arbitration, it allows any party to a consumer contract to
demand it ex post.”).
77. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748, 1753 (finding the Discover Bank rule fatally
“interfere[d] with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus create[d] a scheme inconsistent
with the FAA”); see supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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C. Legal and Legislative Responses to Class Action Waivers PostConcepcion
In the aftermath of Concepcion, we should expect and are beginning to see
more companies incorporating class action waivers into all sorts of consumer
contracts.78 We should also expect that plaintiffs’ class action lawyers will
continue (for a little while, at least) to challenge these waivers, so that courts
will soon be forced to carefully consider the impact of the Concepcion ruling.
The scope of the Concepcion decision therefore requires careful and critical
analysis.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion is clear on one point: that a
broad state law rule holding unenforceable class action waivers in consumer
adhesion contracts will be preempted by the FAA.79 But in recent years
plaintiffs have mounted successful challenges to class waivers on another
theory—“that the waiver’s implicit prohibition against spreading the costs of
litigation across multiple claimants in collective litigation precludes the
individual plaintiff from being able to vindicate her federal statutory rights.”80
Unlike the state law founded unconscionability challenge,81 this theory of
unenforceability is grounded in the Supreme Court’s recognition in Green Tree
Financial Corp. v. Randolph that “the existence of large arbitration costs could
preclude a litigant . . . from effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights
in the arbitral forum.”82 In Randolph, the Court held that “where . . . a party

78. Jonathan Gertler & Christian Schreiber, AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion: The Death
Knell for Class Actions?, PLAINTIFF, June 2011, at 24, 28.
79. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748, 1750, 1753.
80. Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 38, at 633; see also Gilles, Opting Out, supra
note 42, at 407 (“[T]he collective action waiver[’s] . . . implicit ban on spreading across multiple
plaintiffs the costs of experts, depositions, neutrals’ fees, and other disbursements—forces the
individual claimant to assume financial burdens so prohibitive as to deter the bringing of claims.
In the absence of the waiver, the claimant may spread these costs across thousands of coventurers
(or have them advanced by lawyers, as happens in practice). In the presence of the waiver, these
costs fall on her alone. And these costs, in a complex commercial case, will exceed the value of
the recovery she is seeking.”) (footnotes omitted).
81. See Affordable Hous. Found., Inc. v. Silva, 469 F.3d 219, 237 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting an
“an important legal distinction between” preemption analysis, and cases where courts seek “to
reconcile two federal statutes to ensure that one did not trench on the other, a task routinely
performed by federal courts”); Tufariello v. Long Island R.R. Co., 458 F.3d 80, 86 (2d Cir. 2006)
(internal citation omitted) (“[T]he preemption doctrine flows from the Constitution’s Supremacy
Clause, U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2, which ‘invalidates state laws that interfere with, or are contrary
to federal law.’ The doctrine is inapplicable to a potential conflict between two federal
statutes.”); Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 370 F.3d 602, 608 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[P]reemption
does not describe the effect of one federal law upon another; it refers to the supremacy of federal
law over state law when Congress, acting within its enumerated powers, intends one to displace
the other.”).
82. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000).
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seeks to invalidate an arbitration agreement on the ground that arbitration
would be prohibitively expensive, that party bears the burden of showing the
likelihood of incurring such costs.”83
Prior to Concepcion, a few circuit courts had invalidated class action
waivers on this ground84 or recognized the validity of the analysis,85 raising the
question of whether the vindication-of-rights theory survives the Court’s
ruling. In Amex III, the Second Circuit considered this exact question, ruling
“Concepcion does not alter our analysis”86 and finding the class action waiver
“unenforceable[] ‘because enforcement of the clause would effectively
preclude any action seeking to vindicate the statutory rights asserted by the
plaintiffs.’”87 The court interpreted Concepcion as limited to the question of
“whether a state contract law is preempted by the FAA,” as distinct from the
“vindication of statutory rights analysis, which is part of the federal substantive
law of arbitrability.”88 The Amex III decision follows upon and affirms a
number of post-Concepcion district court decisions—interestingly, all out of
the Southern District of New York—finding waivers unenforceable on these
grounds.89 But defendants have sought en banc review, and will surely petition
83. Id. at 92.
84. See, e.g., In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 320 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated
sub nom., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010); Kristian v. Comcast
Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 55, 64 (1st Cir. 2006).
85. See, e.g., In re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litig., 505 F.3d 274, 285 (4th Cir. 2007) (“[I]f a
party could demonstrate that the prohibition on class actions likely would make arbitration
prohibitively expensive, such a showing could invalidate an agreement . . . .”); Livingston v.
Assocs. Fin., Inc., 339 F.3d 553, 557 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph,
531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000)) (“A party seeking to invalidate an arbitration agreement must establish
that the agreement precludes them from effectively ‘vindicating [their] statutory cause of action in
the arbitral forum.’ . . . In the present case, the [plaintiffs] have not offered any specific evidence
of arbitration costs that they may face in this litigation, prohibitive or otherwise, and have failed
to provide any evidence of their inability to pay such costs . . . .”). As the Second Circuit
remarked in Amex III,
In each of these cases, plaintiffs’ attempts to avoid the waiver clause failed because
plaintiffs were unable to demonstrate the class-action waivers barred them from
vindicating their statutory rights. Their failures speak to the quality of the evidence
presented, not the viability of the legal theory. The fact that plaintiffs so often fail in their
attempts to overturn such waivers demonstrates that the evidentiary record necessary to
avoid a class-action arbitration waiver is not easily assembled, and that the courts are
capable of the scrutiny such arguments require.
In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 667 F.3d 204, 217 (2d Cir. 2012).
86. In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 667 F.3d at 206.
87. Id. (quoting In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 304 (2d Cir. 2009)).
88. Id. at 213.
89. See, e.g., Raniere v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 2248, 2011 WL 5881926, at *13
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2011) (“[E]ven if AT & T is read broadly to acquiesce to the enforcement of
an arbitral agreement that as a practical matter would prevent the vindication of state rights in the
name of furthering the strong federal policy favoring arbitration, that would not alter the validity
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for certiorari, so until all appeals are exhausted, the viability of this theory
remains unsettled.90
Challenges to class action waivers based on state statutory or common law
will likely face greater difficulty navigating the Court’s Concepcion decision.
Recall that the Concepcion majority was concerned with state law rules
seeking to regulate the legality of class action waivers that might “stand[] as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress” as expressed in the FAA.91 But because the majority
is not entirely clear on just what “stands as an obstacle” means,92 it is difficult
to predict what sorts of state statutory or common law rules might survive in
the post-Concepcion era. Any analysis arguably requires a case-by-case
evaluation, wherein plaintiffs could show (for example) that the imposition of
the class waiver confers de facto immunity on the defendant or otherwise
violates the savings clause in case-specific, factually intensive ways. Put
differently, “[t]he sin of the Discover Bank rule was that it did not require the
claimant to show that the agreement operated as an exculpatory contract on a
case-specific basis.”93 So it may be possible for state courts post-Concepcion
to invalidate waivers based on recognized defenses to contract on a case-bycase basis (as opposed to California’s “categorical” rule),94 so long as any such
effort does not discriminate against arbitration95 or have the effect of rendering
arbitration, as traditionally defined, unavailable in some category of cases.96

of the federal statutory rights analysis articulated in Mitsubishi, Green Tree [and] American
Express . . . .”); Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 10 Civ. 6950(LBS)(JCF), 2011 WL
2671813, at *3–5 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2011) (declining to apply Concepcion where the question
before the court involved the plaintiff’s ability to vindicate a federal statutory right); Sutherland v.
Ernst & Young LLP, 768 F. Supp. 2d 547, 550–51 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (finding Amex I “retains its
persuasive force” following Stolt-Nielsen).
90. See, e.g., Appellant’s Opening Brief and Appendix Volume I of III at 29 n.2, Homa v.
Am. Express Co., No. 11-3600 (3d Cir. Dec. 21, 2011) (appealing a district court’s enforcement
of an arbitration agreement in light of Concepcion and preserving for en banc review the issue of
whether certain states’ rules are outside the scope of Concepcion).
91. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
92. In using the phrase “stands as an obstacle,” the Concepcion court referred back to Hines
v. Davidowitz, whose only elaboration on the phrase is that “states cannot, inconsistently with the
purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail or complement, the federal law, or enforce
additional or auxiliary regulations.” Hines, 312 U.S. at 66–67.
93. Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 38, at 651.
94. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
95. David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 454 (2011) (explaining
that in Perry v. Thomas, the Supreme Court “described the FAA as a kind of equal protection
clause that bar[s] state courts from applying contract principles in a manner that discriminate[s]
against arbitration”).
96. In one of the first cases to interpret Concepcion, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the
“Supreme Court concluded that the triggering conditions of California’s Discover Bank rule

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2012]

PROCEDURE IN ECLIPSE

1219

If judicial challenges to class action waivers fail post-Concepcion, there
remains some possibility of legislative action.97 For example, Congress could
declare that class action waivers are simply unenforceable—at least in
standard-form consumer and employment contracts. This is the general idea
behind two proposed bills—the Arbitration Fairness Act of 201198 and the
Consumer Mobile Fairness Act of 201199—though neither seems likely to
pass.100
Some hope also lies with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(“CFPB”). The CFBP was created by the Dodd-Frank Act as an independent
bureau within the Federal Reserve, designed to protect consumers in their
transactions with banks, credit card companies, mortgage brokers, and other
financial institutions.101 Section 1028 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires the
CFPB to conduct a study of and submit a report to Congress on the use of
arbitration in consumer transactions, and “prohibit or impose conditions or
limitations on the use of . . . arbitration of any future dispute between the
parties, if the Bureau finds that such a prohibition or imposition of conditions
or limitations is in the public interest and for the protection of consumers.”102
imposed no effective limit on its application” and it “implied that although the Discover Bank
rule was cast as an application of unconscionability doctrine, in effect, it set forth a state policy
placing bilateral arbitration categorically off-limits for certain categories of consumer fraud cases,
upon the mere ex post demand by any consumer.” Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 648 F.3d
1205, 1211 (11th Cir. 2011). For this reason, the Eleventh Circuit recognized, the “Court then
held that . . . this state-imposed policy preference ‘interferes with fundamental attributes of
arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.’” Id.
97. See, e.g., RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 2, at 320 (describing pre-AT&T legislative
proposals to make class action waivers “unenforceable for consumers, or for employees bringing
civil rights claims” as well as “a few targeted statutes [that] have been enacted to limit their
applicability”).
98. S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. (2011).
99. S. 1652, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011). This bill would legislatively overturn Concepcion for
all cell phone contracts, so that “a predispute arbitration agreement between a covered individual
and a provider of mobile service shall not be valid or enforceable.”
100. See Editorial, Gutting Class Action, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2011, at A26 (noting that the
chances of the Arbitration Fairness Act passing to override Concepcion “aren’t great in the
current political environment”); David Lazarus, Lawmakers Should Ensure Consumers Have the
Right to Sue, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2012, at B1 (reporting that the Arbitration Fairness Act “bill
hasn’t gone anywhere since it was unveiled in May [because] [i]ts corporate opponents, including
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, have lobbied against it”); David Lazarus, Aiming to Restore Our
Right to Sue, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2011, at B1 (noting that industry lobbyists oppose both bills).
101. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
1011, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); 12 U.S.C. § 5491 (Supp. 2011).
102. Dodd-Frank Act § 1028(b); 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b). Notably, Dodd-Frank confers similar
authority on the SEC to ban mandatory arbitration in the securities context and flatly prohibits
mandatory arbitration in mortgage and home equity loan contracts. Dodd-Frank Act § 1414(e).
The Act also bans mandatory arbitration that would waive protections for those who blow the
whistle on securities fraud and commodities fraud. Id. §§ 748, 922.
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It is therefore possible that, after conducting its study of arbitration provisions
in consumer contracts, the CFPB might someday issue regulations prohibiting
class action waivers in those contracts over which it has direct authority.103
But as of this writing, the CFPB remains steeped in controversy, as
congressional Republicans have vowed to “defund, delay and defang” the
nascent agency.104 Finally, after a nearly two-year stalemate, President Obama
in January 2012 made a recess appointment of Richard Cordray to direct the
CFPB.105 But even if the CFPB miraculously survives the current political
battle, conducts the arbitration study, and concludes that banning class action
waivers in these contracts is “in the public interest and for the protection of
consumers,”106 “any resulting rule will apply, under [Dodd-Frank’s]
grandfather clause, only to contracts entered into more than 180 days after that
rule is issued.”107 This would severely limit the effectiveness of any
regulations the agency might promulgate.
In sum, judicial, legislative, and regulatory responses to Concepcion
promise little; none appear imminent, likely, or complete. Meanwhile, class
waivers are being inserted into hundreds of contracts by the minute. This begs
the obvious question: What is lost in a world without class actions?
II. WHAT IS LOST IN A WORLD WITHOUT CLASS ACTIONS?
The outlook for aggregate litigation—perhaps all forms of litigation108—in
the wake of Concepcion is bleak. The Supreme Court’s opinion is sufficiently
broad that potential judicial interventions are unlikely or will operate in the
exception rather than the main; and legislative or regulatory fixes appear
infeasible in the current political climate. Taken together, this means that most
class cases will not survive the impending onslaught of class action waivers. A
fundamental question therefore arises: What is really lost in upholding class
action waivers? If private class actions are on the decline, are there other
means by which claimants can seek to have their cases heard and injuries

103. Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 38, at 656 & n.120 (considering the
“enumerated consumer laws” within the CFPB’s jurisdiction).
104. Id. at 655.
105. E.g., Jim Puzzanghera & Lisa Mascaro, Obama Bypassing Senate to Appoint Richard
Cordray Consumer Chief, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2012), http://www.latimes.com/business/money/lafi-obama-cordray-20120104,0,2612330.story.
106. Dodd-Frank Act § 1028(b).
107. Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 38, at 658 (citing Dodd-Frank Act §
1028(d)).
108. Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra note 4, at 80 (asserting that the Court’s rulings in
Concepcion and Wal-mart “make plain that the constitutional concept of courts as a basic public
service provided by government is under siege”).
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compensated, and alternative forms of deterrence to influence a defendant’s
behavior?109
A.

Doing Away With the “Private Attorney General”

One possible response to the demise of private class actions is greater
reliance on public regulatory agencies to adjudicate claims. This vision of a
robust public-agency-centered-rights regime would have the SEC, DOJ, EPA,
FTC, EEOC, and their state counterparts bringing all manner of securities,
antitrust, environmental, consumer, and employment litigation on behalf of
injured citizens. This, of course, is at least theoretically possible; Professor
Resnik has chronicled a similar phenomenon in discussing the steady
migration of adjudicatory functions from courts to administrative agencies,110
with the concomitant increase in administrative personnel.111 For Professor
Resnik, one suspects that such a model—where public authorities are vested
with the exclusive authority to enforce broad public rights—would be
problematic to the extent that it “removes conflict resolution from public
purview,” and therefore fails to capture the benefits of a public, open
adjudicatory ideal.112
But whatever its merits, a massive shift to a public enforcement regime is
completely impractical and antithetical to contemporary socio-political norms.
Private involvement in public civil law enforcement is deeply embedded in our
politics and culture. Indeed, our entire civil justice system is constructed
around the essential idea that private actors will be the “frontline enforcers in
actions redressing broadscale securities fraud, consumer fraud and deceptive
trade practices, antitrust violations (outside of the merger context), civil rights
violations and many other areas.”113 State and local enforcement agencies in
particular (and many federal ones, too114) are funded and organized on the
109. See RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 2, at 306 (“[D]elegating adjudication to other
government institutions, and outsourcing [] represent a movement toward privatization that
removes conflict resolution from public purview.”).
110. Id. at 314–15 (chronicling the creation and evolution of the Court of Claims to the Court
of Federal Claims in the twentieth century, and describing other specialized “agency-based
courts” created by Congressional legislation).
111. Id. at 315 (“[In 2001,] more than 4,700 administrative judges or hearing officers . . .
work in federal agencies deciding specific kinds of claims, such as those brought by social
security recipients, veterans, immigrants or federal employees. . . . During the same era, more
than 10,000 administrative law judges were based in state and local agencies.”).
112. Id. at 306; see also supra note 3 and accompanying text.
113. Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 38, at 625–26; see also Resnik, Fairness in
Numbers, supra note 4, at 112 (“The ability to use courts turns in large measure on the private
bar, a smattering of public legal aid programs, third-party insurance companies, and chronically
underfunded agencies.”).
114. See, e.g., Renee M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Cooperation and
Securities Enforcement, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 126–27 (2005) (“Because the SEC lacks

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1222

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56:1203

clear, if largely unspoken, understanding that a vigorous and well-stocked
private bar sits ready to deploy its ample resources to redress frauds and other
harms perpetrated upon the general public.115 So while “[o]ne can imagine a
world where public agencies assume primary (or even sole) responsibility for
the detection, investigation, and litigation of public frauds, as well as the
collection of ill-gotten gains and the distribution of compensation to injured
persons . . . one would be imagining a very different world—one that provides
orders of magnitude more resources to state and local enforcement
agencies.”116
B.

Is Arbitration the New Adjudication?

Could it be that, post-Concepcion, nothing changes and nothing is lost in
moving from litigation to arbitration—that claims can and will be arbitrated
and resolved within the arbitral forum as they would be in court? This is a
view one often hears from corporate defendants:117 it presumes the arbitral
forum to be sufficient and equivalent to public-court adjudication and takes
seriously the Supreme Court’s apparent judgment that “bilateral” or individual
arbitration is preferable to adjudication.118 Indeed, proponents of ADR have
long asserted that arbitration is superior to litigation, focusing “on
adjudication’s failings—that it is too expensive, too cumbersome, and too
aggressive.”119 Arbitration, on the other hand, is touted as “produc[ing]
significant cost reductions while not altering outcomes.”120 On this view,
arbitration offers “more than adjudication can—more access for claimants, less
cost, and more congenial procedures.”121
Professor Resnik has written extensively on this movement away from
formal adjudication and towards arbitration, as more and more claims are

adequate resources to effectively police the national securities market, supplemental enforcement
is essential to achieve an appropriate level of deterrence.”).
115. See, e.g., Mark E. Budnitz, The Federalization and Privatization of Public Consumer
Protection Law in the United States: Their Effect on Litigation and Enforcement, 24 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 663, 664 (2008) (“Recognizing the resource limitations of government agencies, many
consumer laws provide a private right of action so individual consumers also can litigate
violations of these laws. Many of these laws also provide class actions and statutory damages
which encourage consumers to act as ‘private attorneys general.’”).
116. Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 38, at 626.
117. See RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 2, at 335 (“[T]he movement toward ADR is justified
as offering more than adjudication can—more access for claimants, less cost, and more congenial
procedures.”).
118. Resnik, Fairness, supra note 4, at 117–18 (tracing Supreme Court arbitration decisions).
119. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 2, at 309.
120. Id. at 313. But see id. at 321 (“[S]upport for the proposition that contractual dispute
resolution programs are better than adjudication—in terms of access, costs, speed, or outcomes—
is hard to come by.”).
121. Id. at 335.
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being decided by private arbitral bodies.122 For Resnik, these developments
(which she situates within a broader movement towards privatization of all
sorts of heretofore governmental charges123) are perhaps a natural and expected
result of the success of the adjudicatory model,124 as well as its failures.125 As
more claimants have been vested with legal personhood and viable legal
claims,126 the pressure put on courts has become intense and has led to multidimensional efforts to shift adjudication elsewhere.127
But, as Professor Resnik points out, shifting the work of the courts to other
fora creates problems for the fair administration of justice, as “mini-codes of
civil procedure are being created by . . . a multitude of private providers.”128
Of particular concern to Resnik is the prospect of unequal bargaining power
and the absence of decision-transparency—the due process and fairness
implications of “Contract Procedure.”129 Open courts produce tremendous

122. Id. at 308; see also Resnik, Procedure, supra note 1, at 597 (“[F]ederal judges who once
had declined to enforce ex ante agreements to arbitrate . . . now generally insist on holding parties
to such bargains, thereby outsourcing an array of claims.”).
123. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 2, at 310 (“The outsourcing of what had been a public
function is not a phenomenon unique to courts but rather part of a pervasive pattern in which
various kinds of services (police, detention, school, and the military) have been shifted to the
private sector.”); id. at 336 (describing Jody Freeman and Martha Minow’s work on
“Government by Contract”).
124. See id. at 308 (describing the “very success of courts, attracting large numbers of
claimants imposing demands that exceed capacity,” and the problems created when “governments
have not allocated adequate funds—either for judges and courthouses or for subsidies to litigants
unable to afford court and lawyer fees”); see also id. at 308–09 (describing legislative authority
over judicial salaries resulting in too-low compensation levels for judges as compared to their
counterparts in private practice); id. (describing states’ recessionary responses to justice, such as
closing courthouses, limiting the availability of trials, and imposing increased court fees).
125. See Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra note 4 at 90 (“But not all celebrate the trajectory
that identifies these due process obligations, producing more rights and more claimants knocking
at courthouse doors. The intersection of high demand curves for courts, the burdens of
procedures, the costs of lawyers, and the regulatory successes achieved by some plaintiffs have
prompted diverse critiques, styling the civil justice system as overburdened, overreaching, and
overly adversarial.”).
126. Id. at 105–06 (“As women gained stature as equal persons, state and federal laws
governing families burgeoned to deal with rights to divorce, child custody, and support.
Moreover, both state and federal statutes authorized governments, individuals, and groups to
bring claims and created both procedures and incentives to do so, such as the treble damage
provisions of the antitrust laws, the 1966 class action rule, and the 1976 Civil Rights Attorney’s
Fees Awards Act.”).
127. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 2, at 335 (“Outsourcing, devolution, subcontracting, and
facilitating nonpublic resolutions are increasingly the norm, as courts and legislatures send work
to agencies and to private dispute resolution centers.”).
128. Resnik, Procedure, supra note 1, at 597.
129. See id. at 598, 653. Instead of asking, “How could fair decisions be achieved? What
kind and quantum of information sufficed to render binding judgments that had law’s force
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amounts of information about case proceedings and outcomes; “[i]n contrast,
private dispute resolvers are left to do as they wish,” with little obligation to
“make available to the public information about parties, categories of disputes,
time to disposition, and outcomes.”130 If a vital function that courts serve in
our democracy is to provide citizens a lens into the way law operates, private
arbitration is formally designed to provide no such window: “third parties can
neither attend nor inspect records (if made) of proceedings, opinions are not
published, and parties may be subject to admonitions of confidentiality.”131
The information-suppressing effects of arbitration were once upon a time
considered problematic by the Supreme Court;132 but that view lost favor in the
late-1980s.133
Yet these concerns no longer seem as significant in the aftermath of
Concepcion: class actions are not being “outsourced” to the private arbitral
forum because the class action waiver effectively bars these claims from being
brought in any forum.134 Despite how “quick [and] easy” AT&T’s arbitration
process in the Concepcion case may have been, “few consumers invoked [that]
process”135—and one wonders if any did. Certainly, individual arbitrations of
consumer claims will have a difficult time attracting lawyers, who will find
little profit in representing a handful of small-claims clients.136 As Justice
Breyer asked in his Concepcion dissent, “What rational lawyer would have

behind them? How much process was due?,” id. at 596, our system now asks “when an
enforceable settlement has been achieved, who has the power to bind whom, whether courts
should refuse certain of the bargains struck, and which court has jurisdiction to enforce
settlements when disputes arise.” Id. at 597. Another set of concerns raised by the move away
from adjudication and towards arbitration was the state’s own involvement in validating the
“social and political attitudes [that are] less hospitable to government oversight.” Id. at 623.
130. Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra note 4, at 108.
131. Id. at 111.
132. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435–36 (1953) (finding it problematic that
arbitrators’ awards “may be made without explanation of [arbitrators’] reasons and without a
complete record of their proceedings,” such that no understanding could be had of the
“arbitrators’ conception of the legal meaning” of fundamental doctrinal norms), overruled by
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); see also Judith Resnik,
Many Doors? Closed Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 211, 223–24 (1995).
133. See Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 484 (overruling Wilko).
134. See RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 2, at 336; Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note
38, at 675.
135. Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra note 4, at 111 (internal quotations omitted).
136. See Christopher M. Mason & Benjamin R. Dwyer, Class Action Alert, NIXON PEABODY
LLP, 2, 4 (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.nixonpeabody.com/linked_media/publications/Class_
Action_Alert_04_27_2011.pdf [hereinafter Class Action Alert] (advising companies to “consider
tailoring their contracts to provide the individual customer reasonable access to a fair and
inexpensive dispute resolution process like the contract addressed in Concepcion”); see also infra
note 137.
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signed on to represent the Concepcions in litigation for the possibility of fees
stemming from a $30.22 claim?”137
Moreover, as corporate defendants craft ever more generous and
consumer-friendly arbitration clauses—as we should expect they will so as to
pass legal muster138—courts faced with these provisions will be hard-pressed
to find them insufficient or wanting. In Concepcion, for example, one of the
reasons AT&T’s arbitration clause was viewed so favorably by the Court was
that it provided that claimants were entitled to a $7500 cash award if they
received an arbitration award superior to the defendant’s final pre-award
offer.139 One post-Concepcion decision has already enforced a similar
arbitration clause, which provided that “if the arbitrator awards [plaintiff] more
than [defendant’s] last settlement offer, plaintiffs are entitled to double
attorney’s fees.”140
Resnik’s concern with the contractualization of procedure and the
attendant due process implications of mini-codes141 has been eclipsed by a
grim reality that—at least for aggregate litigation—procedure is no more.
Under current law, class action waivers cut off all viable means of bringing
legal claims, silencing “the communicative possibilities provided through
courts to record, as well as to struggle with, conflicts of meaning, rights, and
facts.”142
In sum, if neither a purely public, administrative, agency-based response,
nor a purely private, individual, arbitration-based response are reasonably

137. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1761 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); see also Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 768 F. Supp. 2d 547, 553 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (“Even if [plaintiff] were willing to incur approximately $200,000 to recover a few
thousand dollars, she would be unable to retain an attorney to prosecute her individual claim. . . .
[Plaintiff’s counsel] will not prosecute her individual claim without charge, and will not advance
the required costs where the [defendant’s] [a]greement’s fee-shifting provisions present little
possibility of being made whole.”); Picardi v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 251 P.3d 723, 725
(Nev. 2011) (noting plaintiffs’ argument that “the class action waiver was exculpatory because, in
cases . . . where the individualized claims are relatively small, it is almost impossible to secure
legal representation unless those claims are aggregated with the claims of other similarly situated
individuals”).
138. See Class Action Alert, supra note 136, at 4 (advising companies to “consider tailoring
their contracts to provide the individual customer reasonable access to a fair and inexpensive
dispute resolution process like the contract addressed in Concepcion”).
139. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745, 1753. Indeed, the district court judge described
AT&T’s arbitration provision as “perhaps the most fair and consumer-friendly provisions this
Court has ever seen.” Makarowski v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, No. CV 09-1590-GAF (CWx), 2009
WL 1765661, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 18, 2009).
140. In re Apple and AT&T iPad Unlimited Data Plan Litig., No. C-10-02553 RMW, 2011
WL 2886407, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 2011) (order granting AT&T Mobility’s motion to compel
arbitration and stay claims except as to plaintiff Hanna).
141. Resnik, Procedure, supra note 1, at 597.
142. See RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 2, at 336.
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foreseeable in the wake of Concepcion, then group-based adjudication may
soon vanish. And as this great mass of consumer protection, antitrust,
employment, and other cases is swept out to sea, the question arises: What or
who can fill the resulting enforcement gap?
III. THE OFFICE OF THE STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL IS OPEN FOR BUSINESS
Elsewhere, I have offered a specific prescription remedying for the
enforcement gap created by Concepcion.143 Specifically, I have suggested that
state attorneys general might step into the void left by private class action
This
attorneys by exploiting their broad parens patriae authority.144
prescription is both practical and strategic: suits brought under parens patriae
are not subject to the strictures of Rule 23, as these are not technically class
actions.145 Therefore, class action waivers ought not apply against the state
attorney general.146
But in addition to be being a functional response to Concepcion, the
prospect of state AGs taking on a more robust enforcement role engages and
interacts with Professor Resnik’s vision of adjudication. If state AGs step up
and assume responsibility for the cases that have traditionally been litigated by
the private class action bar—and particularly if they come to engage private
counsel to help identify and litigate those cases—should we (and would
Professor Resnik) applaud or boo?
On the one hand, for Professor Resnik, one of the main values of public
adjudication of disputes is publicity—the “idea that the public, as an audience”
can watch, participate, and therefore help produce the content and meaning of
law.147 Indeed, for Resnik, “it is the performance of fairness before the public

143. See generally Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 38, at 658–75 (discussing the
ability of the states’ attorneys general to bring suit under parens patriae authority on behalf of the
citizens of their state as a potential remedy to the disappearing ability of citizens to bring class
actions themselves).
144. Id. at 660–61.
145. Id. at 660.
146. But see id. at 664–65 (discussing the possibility that defendants could assert that parens
patriae suits are barred under agency principles, wherein the agent-state attorney general is bound
by the class action waivers agreed to by the principal-consumer; but arguing that agency
principles are incompatible with the theory underlying parens patriae authority).
147. Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra note 4, at 87. She continues:
Fairness requires not only procedurally adequate hearings . . . but also participation from
those outside a litigation triangle, invited to partake in interactive exchanges that produce,
confirm, or reject legal rules. That publicity enables assessments of whether procedures
and decisionmakers are fair and permits an understanding of the impact of resources . . . .
The presence of the public divests both the government and private litigants of control
over the meanings of the claims made and the judgments rendered and enables popular
debate about and means to seek revision of law’s content and application.
Id.
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that legitimates adjudication.”148 This concept of publicity lies at the center of
her democratic theory of courts having a distinct role “in producing,
redistributing, and curbing power.”149 Greater reliance on state AGs—acting
through their own offices or hiring private lawyers to represent the state in
parens patriae cases—has the potential to satisfy Professor Resnik’s insistence
on publicity and public adjudication.
In addition, Professor Resnik’s concerns with accessibility, voice, and
equality150 are also potentially satisfied by an AG-centered model, as the
state’s most prominent and most public law office is well-situated to receive,
triage, and (as warranted) act upon complaints voiced by the citizenry.151 And
the very fact that the claim itself will be heard in open court—that it will not be
deep-sixed by a class action waiver—is a big plus, as is the accountability of
the civil prosecutor to public democratic processes.
But the claim that greater state AG involvement could result in greater
democratic participation in litigation is complicated and indeterminate,
presenting some daunting challenges. To the extent that state AGs rely on
private lawyers to bring claims on behalf of the state, there is the possibility of
pay-to-play type corruption—or at the very least, a system that restricts access
to justice to claims asserted by favored constituents of a centralized
gatekeeper.152 Any such regime153 is flatly antithetical to the values that
animate Professor Resnik’s scholarship. While there are ways to regulate and
proscribe the potential capture of public servants by private interests,154 finding
the political will to utilize parens patriae authority to bring actions on behalf
of injured citizens and to tap private lawyers to bring those actions where cashstrapped AGs’ offices are unable will require tremendous resolve.
In the end, the question here is not a normative one. Whether the state AG
model is a good thing depends, really, on how things play out. It depends on

148. Id.; see also Judith Resnik, Bring Back Bentham: “Open Courts,” “Terror Trials,” and
Public Sphere(s), 5 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 1, 4–5 (2011) (describing Bentham’s view that
publicity enables the electorate to form independent judgments about the quality of government
actions).
149. See RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 2, at xv.
150. See supra notes 11, 15, 128–29 and accompanying text.
151. See Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 38, at 660–64 (explaining the particular
position of state AGs in terms of explicit authorization to redress wrongs on behalf of citizens,
ability to circumvent Rule 23 requirements, and limited standing issues).
152. See generally id. at 670 (worrying that this “model courts ‘pay-to-play’ type abuses,
where state officials extract benefits for bestowing lucrative engagements upon favored members
of the private bar”).
153. Id. at 674 n.230 (citing examples of corrupt “pay-to-play” regimes).
154. See id. at 675 n.232 (describing the American Legislative Exchange Council’s 2008
proposed model legislation entitled the Private Attorney Retention Sunshine Act, requiring “an
open and competitive bidding process prior to the awarding of any state contract for legal
services”).
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people—the choices they make and how they behave. We have to wait and
see.
CONCLUSION
Perhaps Professor Resnik is right that due process procedure is merely “in
eclipse, [but] is surely not dead.”155 But recent years have evidenced a
significant and palpable shift away from the ideals that she reveres. Access to
courts has been limited by doctrines of federal preemption,156 sovereign
immunity,157 heightened pleading requirements,158 limitations on attorneys’
fees,159 exhaustion of remedies requirements,160 and other innovations of a
legal and political system that increasingly views “many kinds of private
litigation as wrong-headed and wasteful.”161 This hostility has proven far more
ferocious when directed against class action litigation, which has been under
siege for decades.
With the decision in Concepcion, the war against class actions seems
nearly done, as opponents have won a string of important battles.162 These
judicial and legislative decisions radically restrict the continued ability of
private actors to vindicate public rights via the class action mechanism. As the
private attorney general model recedes, Professor Resnik’s vision of
adjudication as a public good goes with it. This vision—wherein adjudication
serves democratic goals beyond the resolution of individual or aggregate
claims163—values adjudication’s public dimensions, which “enable a diverse
audience to see the effects of the application of law in many specific
situations.”164 This is a vision of litigation as an “instrument[] of the public, of

155. Resnik, Procedure, supra note 1, at 624.
156. See, e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 330 (2008).
157. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001) (“The ultimate
guarantee of the Eleventh Amendment is that nonconsenting States may not be sued by private
individuals in federal court.”).
158. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (requiring a plaintiff to plead
“factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged”); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56, 570 (2007)
(requiring facts sufficient “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”).
159. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 504 (2006).
160. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2006).
161. Jean Maclean Snyder, Closing the Courthouse Door, LITIG., Fall 2008, at 43, 43.
162. See generally Gilles & Friedman, After Class, supra note 38, at 626–27 & n.13, 658–59
(detailing the increasingly heightened standards on class certification and standing).
163. See Resnik, Whither Adjudication?, supra note 32, at 1102; see also Judith Resnik,
Uncovering, Disclosing, and Discovering How the Public Dimensions of Court-Based Processes
Are at Risk, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 521, 536–37 (2006).
164. Resnik, Whither Adjudication?, supra note 32, at 1102; see also Resnik, Failing Faith,
supra note 33 at 553–54 (“[O]ne of the saving graces of adjudication is its ‘public dimension’—
the accountability and education which flow from its public, visible nature.”); Resnik, A Public
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judges as guardians of the public, and of the public as having an interest in
adjudication beyond its function of concluding disputes of the parties or across
a series of disputes over time.”165 This is a vision on the decline, and without a
strong and immediate response to decisions such as Concepcion that decline
may be severe and permanent.

Dimension, supra note 4, at 417 (“I believe that the norms are generated in the course of the
interaction among disputants and adjudicator, and among disputants, adjudicator, and the public.
This is an interaction over time, during which the polity develops, learns about, and changes the
norms that govern disputes.”).
165. Judith Resnik, Whose Judgment? Vacating Judgments, Preferences for Settlement, and
the Role of Adjudication at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1471, 1527
(1994).
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